[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

protested a US military spy plane flying over Georgia; and the Duma postponed
action on an arms control treaty.36 Putin also, perhaps hoping to further prolong
the crisis, demanded a cease-fire during the first week of the war, as US forces
encountered unexpected resistance.37
In seeking to explain Putin s apparent hardening of policy during the war, there
Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 131
are several possible explanations. First, with the Duma elections drawing closer,
and the Russian public strongly against the war,38 Putin did not wish to leave the
issue solely in the hands of the opposition communist party, especially since his
own party, United Russia, was at the time running into problems.39 Second, with
most of the Muslim world opposing the war, Putin may have felt that a strong
anti-war position could both win Moscow friends in the Muslim world which, as
noted above, Putin was cultivating and also assuage Russia s 20 million Muslims,
many of whom are unhappy with his policy in Chechnya. Indeed, Putin asserted,
 Russia has a community of 20 million Muslims and we cannot but take their
opinion into account, I fully share their concerns. 40 Finally, with Germany and
France also strongly opposing the war, Putin may have felt that the newly created
Franco-German-Russian bloc of states could serve as a check on US unilater-
alism, and Russian opposition to the war would strengthen the prospects of a
multipolar world.
In any case, Russian behavior during the war was clearly not that of a partner,
at least for the United States. This was to change in the post-war period, albeit only
at the margins, and primarily for Russian, not NATO reasons. Thus immediately
after the war Moscow supported the US-sponsored Security Council Resolution
1483, which, while leaving the US fully in control of Iraq, did provide a role, albeit
an unclear one, for the United Nations in the form of special representative, and
both lifted sanctions on Iraq (except for arms) and noted the goal of the resolution
was for the Iraqis to manage their own national resources41  thus holding out
the hope for Moscow that its oil companies and business interests could obtain
lucrative contracts.
In the aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein s regime in Baghdad in April
2003, Putin set two goals for Russia in Iraq. The first goal was to maximize the
number of trade deals with the post-Saddam Iraqi government to bolster the Russian
economy, a primary goal of Putin. Second, Moscow sought to internationalize the
situation in Iraq so that the US would not continue to dominate the one-time ally
of Russia.
As 2004 dawned, Iraq was beset by increasing instability, a development which
posed both opportunities and problems for Moscow. The instability weakened the
US position and offered opportunities for Moscow to project its influence. On the
other hand the growing insurgency also threatened Russian business prospects in
Iraq as well as Russian personnel.
By the end of 2003, despite US efforts to prevent countries, like Russia, who
had not supported the war, from getting reconstruction contracts, Moscow seemed
to be rebuilding its economic position in Iraq. This was, in part, due to the growing
insurgency which led the US to call for all countries holding Iraqi debt to waive
all or part of it so the country could get back on its feet. A now petro-rich Moscow
responded by offering to waive part of the debt, but on the understanding that
Russian companies would have access to the Iraqi market, despite Moscow s
previous strong support for Saddam Hussein. This goal appeared to be achieved
during a late December 2003 visit to Moscow by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, head of
Iraq s governing council, who noted after discussions with Putin,  We received a
132 R.O. Freedman
generous promise to write off the debt, or at least part of it. In return, he noted,
 We will be open to all Russian companies. 42 Immediately thereafter, the Iraqis
began negotiations with the Russian oil company Lukoil on the West Qurna oil
field concession initially promised to Lukoil in 1997, but taken away by Saddam
Hussein on the eve of the 2003 war with the US.43 In observing Russian behavior
in Iraq, a senior US State Department officials commented,  At least so far they re
taking a positive approach in the Iraqi debt, although they obviously have broader
commercial interests  which they are articulating openly  that they hope will be
satisfied at the same time. 44
Meanwhile Russia was already selling to Iraq locomotives, taxis and motorcycles,
and in February 2004 signed a $10 million deal to send Iraq air-conditioned buses.45
Thus, from Moscow s perspective, one of its goals  increased business dealings
with Iraq  was being achieved, with the promise of more contracts to come  and
all this was being done despite Moscow s being banned by the US from the first
round of Iraqi reconstruction contracts.
Unfortunately for Moscow, however, the growing insurgency in Iraq, which
while undermining the US position in the country, was to hurt Russia s own
workers and contracts as well. Thus in April 2004, five Russian workers were
kidnapped. Although they were subsequently released, the hostage-taking incident
was enough to prompt Moscow to begin to evacuate the 553 Russian citizens
working in Iraq, most but not all of whom had left for Russia by 17 April.46
However, possibly seeking to politically exploit the deteriorating situation in Iraq,
newly appointed Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, called for a much larger
role for the United Nations in the rebuilding of that country. Speaking in Dublin,
Lavrov contended that only  with the assistance of the UN will it be possible to
unite all of the opposing forces in Iraq & this is the only way to get the Iraqis to
agree among themselves, with the participation of their neighbors, on how they
want to rebuild their country. Lavrov then added, seeking to forge a greater role
for the UN (and, by implication, a lesser role for the US)  If the idea is to use the
UN in this way, then we will support any proposals. 47
Meanwhile, however, the situation in Iraq worsened for Russians as well as
other foreigners. On 10 May 2004, one Russian was killed, and two more died on
26 May, leading to a further evacuation of Russian citizens48 and striking a further
blow at Russian business interests in Iraq. The deteriorating security situation,
along with a reported willingness on the part of the US and Britain to compromise
further on Iraq, may have prompted Moscow to go along with an amended UN
Security Council draft resolution (No. 1546) which was unanimously approved
on 8 June 2004. The resolution formally ended the period of military occupation
on 30 June and transferred power to an interim government that would rule until
elections were held for a national assembly in January 2005. Resolution 1546
incorporated a number of Russian ideas including the holding of an international
conference on Iraq to assist the political process. Perhaps most important for
Moscow, the resolution stated that after 30 June 2004 the Iraqis would exercise
full sovereignty and would have control over their natural resources  a potential
boon for Russian companies  and that the Iraqis would control security issues,
Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 133
with the US-dominated multinational force remaining in Iraq at the request
of Iraq s interim government and also being accountable to the UN Security
Council.49
In theory at least, these were major achievements for Moscow. Iraq had been
 internationalized thus weakening US control, and the US would no longer [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]